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Introduction
The growth of the Korean labor movement during the period of 
transition to democracy is regarded as part of labor movements that occurred 
in newly industrializing countries in the 1970s and 1980s (Koo 2001). In 
particular, new labor unionism in Brazil, South Africa, and Korea not only 
represented the narrow economic interests of organized labor but also served 
as the central force of social movements, through which continuous efforts 
were made to expand democratization. This led to the labor movements in 
these nations collectively being referred to as “social movement unionism” 
(Waterman 1993; Seidman 1994; Moody 1997). In addition, Korea’s 
experience is contrasted to Japan’s weak labor movement from an East Asian 
perspective. The point here is that the organizational structure of Korean 
labor unions is based on the enterprise union, which is similar to that of 
Japan. However, compared to the Japanese enterprise union system in which 
peaceful industrial relations are maintained and unions function as an 
internal business organization mobilized for productivity enhancement, labor 
militancy in Korea is active and political unionism grows within the 
enterprise union (Jung 2011a). Thus Korea’s labor movements can be referred 
to as “militant” enterprise unionism which attempt to employ direct actions 
to break through the limitations of the enterprise union system enforced by 
an oppressive government. 
Nonetheless, the Korean labor movement went through a dramatic 
change with the rapid progression of neoliberal globalization after the 
financial crisis in the late 1990s. It seems as though “social movement 
unionism” has been traded for “business unionism” that defends the narrow 
economic interests of organized labor. Major changes in the Korean labor 
movement during the period of neoliberal globalization can be attributed to 
two related factors. 
The first is the weakening of the representativeness, or the reduced social 
influence, of the labor movement. After peaking at 19% in 1989, union 
density in Korea has since been steadily declining to a mere 10% as of today. 
Furthermore, organized labor has come to primarily represent full-time 
regular employees working for large companies. In contrast, full-time regular 
workers in small businesses and the absolute majority of irregular employees 
are in the unorganized sector. This means that current labor unionists in 
Korea are most likely to be involved in favorable labor markets, which are 
shrinking in size. The second change is the crisis of solidarity in the labor 
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movement. The labor movement during the period of democratization was 
highly dedicated not only to labor solidarity but also to popular movements 
and social solidarity; however, solidarity weakened after the financial crisis of 
1997, and sectionalist tendencies increased instead. Accordingly, the nature 
of the Korean labor movement gradually degenerated from being a social 
movement to becoming an interest-group movement (Choi 2005; Shin 2010; 
Cho 2011). Such a change is prominent in the labor unions of family-owned 
industrial conglomerates (chaebŏls) in the export sector. 
What is interesting is that the militancy of the labor unions remains the 
same despite the declining solidarity among the labor unions belonging to 
Korean chaebŏls. Unions at Korean chaebŏls, particularly those of 
automakers, represent the typical case of militant unions. Union leadership 
has a strong ideological tendency that primarily regards industrial relations in 
a conflicting and confrontational way; but workers show little interest in 
establishing a high-performance work system based on cooperation, and 
union activities become centered on aggressive collective bargaining based on 
workplace collectivism, with frequent strikes in the process. 
In sum, while still militant, the labor unions of Korean chaebŏls lack 
solidarity. How did this phenomenon of “labor militancy without solidarity” 
come to represent the union movement of Korean chaebŏls in the export 
sector in the era of neoliberal globalization? How did the culture of solidarity 
in the Korean labor movement suddenly disappear? These are the questions 
posed by this study. 
To answer these questions, the automotive industry labor movement, 
which represents militant unionism of Korea, has been selected for this study. 
To be more specific, case studies were conducted with the Hyundai Motor 
Company (hereafter HMC), which is the largest automaker in Korea’s 
automobile industry. This study first examines how militant enterprise 
unionism has come to settle in the overall context of Korea’s industrial 
relations and wage-bargaining institutions. Next, the reason for the 
continuance of the union’s militancy, even after HMC has grown into a global 
corporation, will be discussed. Finally, changes in the labor movement of 
Hyundai Motor Union (hereafter HMU) for the past twenty years will be 
evaluated by analyzing its protest events and the detailed process of the 
decline in its workers’ solidarity. 
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Case Selection and Data Gathering
Automobile workers all around the world have built up a well-deserved 
reputation as militant workers in the twentieth century. After analyzing major 
waves of labor unrest of automobile workers in the 20th century, Silver (2003) 
found that the strike wave of Korean automobile workers, alongside those of 
Brazil and South Africa, represent the third major wave of global labor unrest 
in the industry, followed by the first wave around North America in the 
1930s1940s and the second one around West Europe in the 1950s-1960s. The 
global transition of labor unrest resulted from the geographical relocation of 
automobile industries in the capitalist world-system (Moody 1997; Silver 
2003). At the time of spatial relocation of automobile production to the newly 
industrializing countries, HMC took off as the largest automaker in Korea 
under the financial support of the developmental state (Kwon and O’Donnell 
2001). Immediately after that, HMC became the epicenter of militant labor 
movements in Korea. General information about HMC and its union is as 
follows.
HMC, one of the core subsidiaries of the Hyundai Business Group, was 
established in 1967 and began to develop as the leading automobile company 
in Korea. It constructed a mass production system, after which it aggressively 
started to explore the international market. Based on the expansion of 
domestic and export sales, HMC has pushed forward with an overseas 
production strategy to become a major global automaker since the late 1990s. 
There are at present three domestic plants as well as overseas plants in seven 
countries. As shown in table 1, the domestic production capacity of HMC is 
1.9 million units per year, which is the largest among Korean automakers. 
Table 1
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 Note.—Total number of employees and union members includes those who work outside 
assembly plants.  
 Sources.—HMC homepage (www.hyundai.com); HMU internal document (Nov. 2011).
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Established in July 1987, HMU is the largest labor union in Korea, with 
around 42,000 union members. It is affiliated with Korean Confederation of 
Trade Unions (KCTU), which was established in 1995, as the national center 
for independent labor unions. While HMC workers were originally 
organized as an enterprise union just like most workers in Korea, it 
transformed its union organization type to industrial union in 2006. Its union 
members are composed of various occupations, but most of them are blue-
collar workers in production plants. 
Since HMC has been one of the strategic establishments for export-
oriented industrialization and its union the biggest among progressive 
KCTU-affiliated unions, HMC has played the role of pattern-setter in 
national industrial relations. In addition, as its workers have staged or 
threatened to strike almost every year until now, HMU is an emblem of 
militant unionism in Korea. 
The data for this study is drawn from primary and secondary document 
analyses of HMC and HMU activities and interviews with 34 persons 
concerned during a field survey from January 2007 to October 2008 in the 
city of Ulsan. In addition, in order to analyze the longitudinal changes of 
HMC workers’ collective protests, I conducted a “protest event analysis” using 
published local daily newspaper articles of the city of Ulsan (Kyeongsang ilbo) 
from July 1987 to December 2010. This method has been often used in the 
field of social movement research since the 1970s (Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975; 
Paige 1975; Tarrow 1989; Kriesi et al. 1995). 468 protest events were gathered 
and coded according to the pre-designed coding scheme (see appendix for 
details).
Militant Enterprise Unionism in the Context of Industrial 
Relations in Korea
Despite the emergence of a new labor movement and democracy in 
1987, the Korean government and the employers insisted on a labor-exclusive 
strategy and maintained a policy that disapproved of the new democratic 
labor movement. In the ten years following democratization, the government 
continued to block nationwide organization of labor unions, maintained a 
labor law that prohibited union political activities while forbidding solidarity 
among unions, and did not acknowledge participation of labor in the 
policymaking process. Employers also maintained traditional anti-unionism 
while reluctantly accepting industrial citizenship into the decision-making 
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process within an enterprise. Faced with such structural conditions, Korean 
labor unions resisted the union avoidance strategy of the capital with intense 
labor mobilization at the workplace. 
The chaebŏls implemented the “carrot-and-stick” strategy for labor 
unions, which rapidly grew during the transition to democracy. Attempts 
were made to achieve industrial peace and to prevent political unionism from 
spreading among ordinary workers by offering union members fringe 
benefits and a drastic wage increase as bait while maintaining an 
uncompromising and confrontational attitude toward leadership that was 
solidarity-oriented or that advocated political unionism. Such labor relations 
strategy of the chaebols was not entirely successful. Among the subsidiaries of 
the Hyundai Group, Hyundai Heavy Industry is a successful case of the 
“carrot-and-stick” strategy in which political unionism was defeated, whereas 
HMC represents a prominent case of one that failed.
During this process, institutionalization of collective bargaining began to 
appear in numerous companies starting in the early 1990s. Annual company-
level wage bargaining (wage bargaining still typically occurs once a year in 
Korea) has created a regular pattern, and industrial conflict started to unfold 
gradually within the predictable range according to legal procedures. Under 
such circumstances, chaebŏl labor unions in the export sector formed labor 
movement identities known as “militant economism.” According to Cho 
(2005), militant economism can be regarded as the identity of the labor 
movement that aggressively pursues the economic interests of its members 
against the hostile attitude of the state and the capital through militant 
mobilization at the workplace. It was also a strategic choice of chaebŏl unions 
with a relatively high level of ability to mobilize shop-floor workers, under 
the structural constraints of the labor law that was enforced for the purpose 
of confining union movements within the boundaries of the enterprise by 
prohibiting political activities and hindering solidarity between unions.1 
Such militant economism was most prominent in the chaebŏl unions’ 
aggressive struggle for wage increase. Industrial relations in Korea represent 
the characteristic of “single-employer bargaining” type in which wage setting 
1 Although the Korean labor law, newly revised during the transition to democracy, repealed the 
existing clause that only allowed enterprise unions, it still prohibited any political activities of labor 
unions and “third-party” interventions in labor disputes as well as the establishment of multiple 
unions in enterprise or upper-association levels. These repressive clauses of the labor law were 
repealed in 1996 and 1997. However, the freedom of establishing multiple unions at the enterprise 
level was not allowed until June 2011. In addition, the government of Korea has yet to ratify the ILO 
core conventions on the “freedom of association” (No. 87) and “the right to bargain collectively” (No. 
98).
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is extremely decentralized at the enterprise level, with almost no wage 
coordination by upper-level associations (OECD 2004; Park 2005; Jung 
2011b). Accordingly, there is little coordination among Korea’s labor market 
actors, and the workers’ incentive structure is dictated by short-term wage 
maximization, with a very weak central union that can promote long-term 
interests while suppressing the short-term incentive structure of the rank-
and-file workers (Soskice 1990; Park 2005). In addition, chaebŏl unions had 
the organizational resources and bargaining power to realize such a short-
term incentive structure; fragmented wage-setting games were very appealing 
to them. 
Such wage-setting customs were evident in the wage-bargaining process 
at HMC. Despite the institutionalization of collective bargaining, conflict and 
distrust persisted in labor relations at the company, and there was a repetitive 
pattern of bargaining outcome being determined solely by the power struggle 
between labor and management. In short, for a union that maintains strong 
workplace bargaining power in labor relations overridden with confrontation 
and distrust, the militancy of workers at HMC was an influential means to 
maximize the economic interests of its members. 
However, as time passed, the militant economism of the chaebŏls’ labor 
movement has caused segmentation within the entire working class. After the 
early 1990s, the successful results of militant economism achieved by the 
labor movement of conglomerate unions could not reach workers at small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (hereafter SMEs). The pursuit of short-term 
wage maximization by unions at SMEs became one of the causes of reduced 
investments and severe job insecurity in the sector. The wage gap between 
SMEs and conglomerates grew wider as the wage increase of SMEs slowed 
down since the beginning of the early 1990s. Therefore, militant economism 
under the Korean wage determination system contributed to the structural 
segmentation of the labor market, which was relatively homogeneous 
regardless of the size of the enterprise until the mid-1980s. Consequently, the 
increase in heterogeneity has caused the erosion of the social basis of 
working-class solidarity. 
Figure 1 shows the trend in the wage gap from 1980 to 2007 by company 
size. There are two periods in which wage gaps widened significantly: one is 
during 1987–1991, and the other is after 2002. Heterogeneity of Korean 
workers’ market conditions appeared since 1987, and the next big gap 
occurred during the economic recovery period after the financial crisis of 
1997. During the 2000s, the structural segmentation between conglomerate 
workers in primary labor markets and SME workers in secondary labor 
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markets increasingly intensified while heterogeneity of market conditions 
among all of the workers increased. 
The relatively homogeneous market conditions for workers that 
promoted working-class solidarity in the 1980s has become so diluted that 
even traces of it are difficult to find, while heterogeneity among workers 
intensified. Under the enterprise union system of Korea, the uncoordinated 
and fragmented wage bargaining not only failed to control the segmentation 
of the labor markets, but actually contributed to strengthening the 
sectionalist tendency of conglomerate unions. As shown above, the social 
basis for current working-class solidarity in Korea is highly vulnerable. With 
heterogeneity in the internal configuration of the working class and the 
weakening basis of solidarity, the militant labor movement of chaebŏl 
companies has come to be socially regarded as “a league of its own.” In the 
following section, we will enter the stadium of the “league.” 
Discontented Affluent Workers in a Global Corporation
HMC workers have gained their employment security and continuous 
wage increases by virtue of the rise of the global market share of the company 
(10-29 employees = 100)
 Fig. 1.—Wage gap by establishment size, 1980-2007. These figures are based on 
the total monthly cash earnings of regular employees in all industries (Source: 
Ministry of Labor, Report on Monthly Labor Survey, each year).
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and the strong workplace bargaining power of the labor union. Additionally, 
union leadership, a two-year term of office, has often instigated distributional 
conflicts with management in order to raise wages and serve consecutive 
terms in office. Thus, the living standards of HMC workers have improved 
substantially via their interconnection with the company’s outstanding ability 
to pay, strong workplace bargaining power of the labor union, and fierce 
electoral competition for leadership among various factions within the union. 
HMC workers’ affluence is, however, contrasted sharply with the 
unfavorable working conditions of the majority of wage earners in Korea, 
especially those employed in SMEs, who suffer from growing economic 
insecurity, stagnation in real income, and decrease of decent jobs since the 
economic crisis of 1997. As seen in figure 2, in which the wage level of 
average HMC employees is compared with that of other wage earners in 
various occupations, it seems apparent that HMC workers are very “affluent 
workers” in Korea. When the variables of age-band and gender are 
controlled, HMC workers earn more than managers or professionals in other 
industries and almost twice as much as similar occupation groups working in 
other companies. 
(Unit: Thousand won)
 Fig. 2.—Comparison of the average monthly wage of HMC employees with that of 
other Korean male employees aged 40 to 44 by occupation, 2011. National data are 
made for males aged of 40 to 44 employed at establishments with 5 employees or 
more. Monthly wage = regular payment + overtime payment + (annual special 
payment/12) [Sources: Ministry of Employment and Labor, Survey Report on Labor 
Conditions by Employment Type (2011); Korean Metal Workers Union (KMWU), 
Survey Report on the Actual Condition of KMWU Members (2011)].
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The embourgeiosement in Western Europe and the United States was 
observed during the 1950s and 1960s (Marcuse 1964; Goldthorpe et al. 1969). 
Taking the level of wage income into account, the embourgeiosement of HMC 
workers is an expected phenomenon, but it is interesting to note that, unlike 
“affluent workers” in Western societies, those at HMC have a strong 
collectivist disposition, a propensity toward militancy, and widespread 
discontent with their industrial life. Furthermore, compared with Japanese 
automobile workers, HMC workers appear to be almost indifferent to the 
attempts to promote labor-management cooperation. From such comparative 
perspectives, HMC workers could be referred to as “discontented affluent 
workers.” We can understand this as the result of management strategy, labor 
relations, production technology, and work practices as follows, all of which 
have evolved for a long time at HMC. 
First, the long-standing adversarialism in the milieu of low-trust 
relationship has prevailed in industrial relations at HMC. While 
adversarialism at HMC resulted from the critical juncture of Korean 
industrial relations during the transition to democracy, it was amplified and 
then reproduced due to workers’ traumatic experiences in the large-scale 
restructuring of 1998. 
Under the direct impact of the 1997 financial crisis and the IMF bailout, 
HMC tried to carry out a corporate restructuring plan which included 
massive layoffs. Against this attempt, its labor union organized factory-
occupation strike for 36 days in the summer of 1998. Suspicious of 
management’s intentions due to a lack of deliberate consultation with union 
representatives, HMC workers considered the restructuring scheme as 
vicious attacks on the labor union. While redundant workforce – the total 
number of redundancies was 10,166 and the employment volume was 
actually reduced by 22 percent in 1997-98 – experienced trauma such as 
livelihood crisis, family dissolution, and loss of respect, most laid-off 
employees and those who had been granted unpaid leave could return to 
work when business activities of the industry rapidly recovered; hence, the 
labor union was able to win back its organizational power. 
The corporate restructuring had perverse effects on labor relations for a 
decade; the psychological contract between management and labor was 
decisively damaged, and workers felt a sense of instability in their 
employment. Since then, HMC workers came to regard the top manager of 
the company as a cold-hearted capitalist who treats them as the latent target 
of cost reduction and who refuses to accept the labor union as a partner. In 
other words, workers have a deep distrust of management. 
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Secondly, the distinctive feature that characterizes the production system 
of HMC is its labor-exclusive nature. HMC has developed its own production 
system by modifying the so-called Toyotism, or Japanese production system, 
to adapt to the company’s peculiar environments (Jo 2005). Compared to 
traditional US automakers, both HMC and Japanese automakers have 
achieved high flexibility in production as they respond to changing demands. 
They have, however, developed quite different production systems from each 
other. While Japanese companies have achieved flexibility through 
specialization of labor process based on shop floor-oriented and labor-
participatory automation, Hyundai’s flexibility heavily relies on the 
standardization of labor process based on engineer-led and labor-exclusive 
automation (Lee and Jo 2007). 
Hyundai’s production system is less dependent on workers’ skill or active 
participation of production workers. Due to the standardization of labor 
process based on de-skil ling, shop-f loor workers become easily 
interchangeable. In retrospect, the peculiarity of Hyundai’s production 
system is the outcome of the adversarial nature of workplace industrial 
relations (Jo 2005). Under such circumstances, the production technology of 
labor-exclusive automation was rapidly introduced in plant operations as 
management’s attempt at increasing the skill of production workers was 
discouraged or failed in the 1990s. Since then, HMC has tried to compensate 
for the defects in the rigidity of the work organization by switching to 
engineer-led automation and multi-layered control systems. 
Under such a production system, union representatives give weight to 
shop-floor bargaining with supervisors or production managers in order to 
ease the pressure of managerial control, and consequently, the 
confrontational nature of workplace is further intensified between labor and 
management. Thus, production workers have a big stake in the capability of 
the labor union’s workplace bargaining power to protect them from the 
interchangeability of deskilled workers. 
Thirdly, HMC has been promoting expansion of overseas production 
since the late 1990s (Lansbury, Suh, and Kwon 2007; Jo and You 2011), and 
workers consider it a potential threat to their prospective employment for 
when HMC scales down home production to decreased demand in 
international markets. HMC has recently become a full-fledged multinational 
auto company, aggressively extending its overseas production plants in 
Turkey, India, China, United States, Czech Republic, Russia, and Brazil. As 
indicated in table 2, the proportion of the number of cars manufactured by 
overseas plants slightly exceeds that of home plants in Korea. Hyundai Motor 
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Group – the parent company of HMC – has become the second largest 
automaker in Asia after Toyota and the world’s fifth largest automaker in 
recent years. 
However, in comparison with the rapid growth in overseas production, 
the output of home production has not significantly increased during the first 
decade of the new millennium. Therefore, HMC workers in Korea are 
concerned that future domestic jobs would decline if production at overseas 
plants replaces domestic production on exported cars. In addition, they 
worry about the potential “threat effects” on the labor union’s bargaining 
power, which could be realized when HMC takes advantage of the 
competition among its many global plants. Thus, the labor union has 
continuously opposed expansion of overseas production, and has made a 
series of collective agreements with HMC to keep up present production 
volume in domestic plants as well as to protect workers’ employment until 
regular retirement. In spite of such written agreements, workers hardly trust 
management because they remember the traumatic experiences of the 1998 
restructuring process. 
Finally, one of the HMC production workers’ discontents with their 
industrial life is the system of long working hours with day-and-night 
shiftwork, which means that one who work the day shift this week has to 
works the night shift the following week from 9 p.m. to 8 a.m.; material 
affluence of HMC workers cannot be sustained without the long working 
hour system. According to HMC’s document, the average annual working 
Table 2 
annual production and sales of Korean automotive industry and 
HMC, 1990-2010
(Thousand units, %)















































 Source.—Korea Automotive Manufacturers Association, Monthly Automotive Statistics.
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hours of HMC production workers range around 2,400-2,600 hours during 
the recent ten years. Compared to production workers of foreign automakers, 
they work around 800 hours per year more on average (Ministry of 
Employment and Labor 2011). These abnormally long hours are due 
primarily to “normalized” overtime during weekdays or even weekends, 
which reach almost one third of the total working hours. 
Moreover, most of the HMC production workers are regularly expected 
to work the day-and-night shiftwork that leave them in a state of chronic 
work-life imbalance such as lack of leisure time, life rhythm mismatched with 
family members, and social marginalization in community life. In particular, 
they generally suffer from want of a sense of emotional connection with 
dependent family members due to the time constraint. 
In sum, HMC workers are discontented with their factory life in spite of 
their material affluence, and they have a sense of insecurity about their social 
position, which are structured from the interaction of adversarial labor-
management relations, labor-exclusive nature of the production system, rapid 
expansion of overseas production and the consequential instability of 
employment, and work-life imbalance. Thus, widespread discontent among 
affluent workers is functioning as a seedbed for workplace collectivism and 
labor militancy. Under these circumstances, HMC workers consider their 
labor union as a kind of “insurance” against uncertain futures in the era of 
globalized economy. Whereas militant unionism contributed in the past to 
fostering labor solidarity and the expansion of industrial citizenship during 
the transition to democracy, it is used as a weapon for mainly protecting the 
vested interests of union members in the prosperous large enterprise in the 
age of globalization. In other words, the aim of labor militancy has shifted as 
the next section shows. 
Shifted Aim of Labor Militancy: From Solidarity to Social 
Closure
Changes in labor protests and strike action 
The aim of labor militancy of HMC workers has changed from class 
solidarity to social closure in order to defend their vested interests. For that 
reason, the more HMU has acted so militantly, the more it has been isolated 
from overall labor movements and civil society. The method of “protest event 
analysis” is used in this paper to trace the labor protests of HMC workers 
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(Rucht and Ohlemacher 1992; Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Earl et al. 2004) in 
order to investigate the changed aim of industrial actions of HMC workers 
during the past 24 years (see appendix for detailed coding principle). 
Figure 3 illuminates the trend in HMC workers’ protest events by 
categorizing them into different types of action from 1987 to 2010. Two 
features are noticeable in figure 3. First, the frequency of labor protest events 
has not changed significantly before and after the peak of labor unrest in 
1998. Judging from this fact, it can be concluded that HMC workers’ 
industrial actions have at least not declined during the 2000s, i.e., labor 
militancy is still at work, in spite of the gradual institutionalization of 
collective bargaining and increasing material affluence. 
Secondly, with regard to the types of labor protests, there have been 
some changes in the way that HMC workers have staged protests. Compared 
to the pre-1998 period, the protests in the 2000s depend on somewhat less 
radical forms. This reflects the fact that militant unionism that prevailed until 
the mid-1990s resulted from defensive responses against government 
oppression and employers’ union avoidance strategies, whereas labor 
militancy in the 2000s is mainly used as an effective instrument for workers 
to get their demands within the boundaries of institutionalized collective 
bargaining system. Such a change is more clearly verified by the strike 
patterns of HMC workers.2 
2 Unionized workers of automakers have earned a reputation for having the largest propensity for 
strikes in Korea. For example, the number of working days lost by strikes at Hyundai Motor Group 





Fig. 3.—Trend in the frequency of the labor protests of HMC workers (Source: Labor 
Protest Events Dataset, Yoo (2012). See appendix).
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Figure 4 illuminates longitudinal trends in HMC workers’ strike actions. 
What is interesting is the contrast between the frequency and the duration of 
strikes over the past 24 years. Whereas the strike frequency tended to 
increase, the average duration per strike sharply decreased. Specifically, from 
1987 to 1995, strikes occurred twice a year, and the average duration per 
strike was 6.6 days; but from 2002 to 2010, the numbers are, respectively, five 
times a year and 0.9 days per strike on average. In other words, the frequency 
of HMC workers’ strike actions increased, but as shorter events. During the 
first decade of the new millennium, most industrial actions took the pattern 
of partial and discontinuous strikes that lasted only several hours a day, after 
which the labor union was able to coerce its counterpart to the bargaining 
table to demand additional wage increase. In this sense, HMC workers’ strike 
actions have become routinized. 
While strike actions of HMC workers during the era of democratization 
was often the collective expression of class antagonism against the state or the 
employers, industrial disputes in the age of globalization has primarily been 
an instrumentally effective means of “getting more” out of the bargaining 
table. Therefore, recent strike actions are disturbances set within “the rules of 
the game” in which one can easily predict the opponent’s next actions. 
Although HMC workers have consistently displayed their militancy until 
now, their combativeness has become the instrument among “insiders” for 
(i.e., HMC and Kia Motors Company) accounts for 26 percent of total working days lost from 2001 
to 2006 (Bae et al., 2008, p. 101).
Fig. 4.—Changes in the strike patterns of Hyundai automobile workers (Source: 
Labor Protest Events Dataset. See appendix).
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maximization of labor’s share of the prosperous chaebŏls rather than the 
sword of justice and class solidarity at the societal level. 
Withering away working-class solidarity?
The recent decline of the culture of solidarity has been observed in the 
following two aspects: One is HMC workers’ exclusive stance toward 
subcontract workers within the workplace, and the other is the separation of 
wage bargaining structure from auto workers outside the plant. 
Firstly, HMU took an exclusive attitude toward in-house subcontract 
workers rather than an inclusive one. Subcontract workers are employed by 
small subcontracting firms who allocate the workers to large client firms with 
whom they have contracted to supply labor. Over the past ten years, the size 
of subcontract workers in HMC plants reached 6,000 to 8,000 accounting for 
20%-30% of total production workforce (Cho 2006; Lee Jong-Woon 2011). 
In the early 1990s, HMC introduced in-house subcontracting at first 
mainly in indirect production activities such as material delivery, facility 
maintenance, and packaging. After the 1998 restructuring, however, 
subcontracting has been allocated to the main production sites. Furthermore, 
on many occasions, the subcontract workforce and the regular workforce 
perform the same tasks side by side on the assembly line. In spite of doing 
identical jobs, the wage and working conditions of subcontract workers are 
markedly inferior to those of regular employees,3 and the employment status 
of subcontract workers is very unstable due to their short-term contracts with 
subcontracting firms.
HMU has considered subcontract workers as a “buffer” against 
fluctuations in market demands rather than as the object of solidarity. A case 
that is representative of this is the collective agreement on employment 
security of 2000, in which HMU and HMC reached an agreement to 
maintain the ratio of subcontract workers at 16.9% in production plants for 
the purpose of employment security of regular workers. In addition, the labor 
union tacitly acquiesced to additional utilization of subcontract workers by 
management. 
Above all things, HMU refuses to include subcontract workers as union 
3 Subcontract workers’ wage income remains considerably lower than that of HMC’s regular 
employees. The average monthly wage of subcontract workers reaches only 60%-70% of that of 
regular workers (Cho 2006). In addition, subcontract workers are not entitled to major fringe 
benefits enjoyed by regular workers such as scholarship for the children of employees, medical cost 
assistance for workers and their dependents, company housing, and so on. 
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members, and the subcontract workers established their own union in 2004 
to demand a shift in their employment status to regular positions and to 
make a claim for horizontal solidarity toward regular workers’ union. 
Although HMU leadership made several attempts to open the door of union 
membership to subcontract workers, union representatives refused to include 
them on three different occasions in 2007 and 2008. Until now, subcontract 
workers have been excluded from the labor union of regular workers who 
seek to protect regular workers’ interests from outsiders, i.e., subcontract 
workers. Not only were union leaders half-hearted about the organizational 
inclusion of subcontract workers, but there were also conflict of interest 
between the two groups of workers over economic rewards and employment 
status. Thus, the behavior of HMC’s regular workers comes under the “social 
closure” strategy (Weber 1968, p. 342; Parkin 1979) by which insiders with 
vested interests seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to resources 
and opportunities only to themselves. 
Secondly, the labor union of HMC has taken a passive attitude toward 
the labor movement’s wage policy for narrowing wage differentials with other 
organized workers in the automobile industry. Since the late 1990s, national 
leadership in Korean labor union movements has made strategic efforts to 
transform the structure of labor unions into an industrial union because they 
thought that Korean labor movements cannot cope with the pressure of 
globalization and neoliberal restructuring without organizational 
transformation. In this context, Korean Metal Workers Union (KMWU) was 
established in 2001 primarily by approximately 30,000 workers from 
enterprise unions at auto supplier companies. Following that, large-sized 
enterprise unions in automobile companies – so-called “Big 3” such as HMC, 
Kia Motors Company, and GM Korea – joined KMWU in 2006, after which 
membership jumped to 140,000 and KMWU became the biggest industrial 
union in Korea. Since then, existing union members of HMU belong to the 
“local HMC branch”branches of KMWU. 
In spite of centralization of the organizational structure, the 
decentralized and fragmented structure of collective bargaining in the 
automobile industry still remains. The “Big 3” companies have adamantly 
resisted industrial-level bargaining, and enterprise  branches of KMWU have 
taken a passive stance about it until now. Thus, there has been a separation of 
the bargaining system between large automobile companies and small- and 
medium-sized auto supplier firms4 in which the differentials of wages and 
4 According to KMWU’s internal documents, the industry-level bargaining coverage is around 
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working conditions between them have widened (Lee Joohee 2011; Lee and 
Yi 2012). Whereas organized workers at auto suppliers seek to centralize 
wage bargaining, those working for the “Big 3” automakers want to maintain 
the existing autonomy of the enterprise-level bargaining system. The reason 
is that centralized bargaining would be a way into wage moderation or wage 
concession for workers with relatively high wage at large automakers. In other 
words, automobile workers of chaebŏls strongly prefer sectionalism to 
solidarity in labor union’s wage policy. 
Therefore, industrial unionism in the automobile industry is now at the 
incipient stage, or in the phase of premature demise. Under the demise of 
solidarity, the militancy of organized labor in chaebŏls produces socially 
isolated labor unionism and degenerates into collective behavior to protect 
the union members’ narrow interests. 
Conclusion
Korean labor movements, particularly those of the automobile industry, 
went through a dramatic change with the rapid progression of neoliberal 
globalization after the financial crisis of the late 1990s. The so-called “social 
movement unionism” which received worldwide attention in an earlier 
period has been traded for “business unionism” that defends the narrow 
economic interests of union members. Based on a case study of the trajectory 
of militant unionism at HMC since the late 1980s, this study has explored the 
changed characteristics of Korean labor movements. 
Labor militancy of independent labor movements at Korea’s leading 
firms such as HMC has first been shaped in the overall context of the 
confrontational nature of industrial relations, harshly repressive labor law, 
and the fragmented wage-bargaining system during the period of democratic 
transition. Even after HMC grew into a global automaker and its workers 
could enjoy higher living standards, militant labor unionism at HMC has 
prevailed until now. Union leadership and management tend primarily to 
regard each other in a conflicting and confrontational way, and union 
activities still center on aggressive collective bargaining with frequent strike 
actions. However, despite the continuance of labor militancy, the goal of the 
only 15% of all union members of KMWU in 2012. Most of them are workers employed in small-
sized auto supplier companies. Korea Metal Industrial Employers Association, the bargaining 
partner of KMWU, is composed of 106 membership companies, most of whom are auto suppliers 
with an average of 246 employees (http://kmiea.or.kr). 
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union has dramatically shifted from class solidarity to social closure in order 
to defend the narrow economic interests of union members. The recent 
decline of class solidarity is observed in the exclusive attitude toward 
in-house subcontract workers’ claim for horizontal solidarity, and in HMC 
union’s sectionalism in defense of the autonomy of enterprise-level wage 
bargaining system that differentiates from other SMEs. In conclusion, we can 
say that “labor militancy without solidarity” comes to represent the nature of 
the labor union movements of Korean chaebŏls in the export sector in the era 
of neoliberal globalization.  
Current labor unionism at HMC is Janus-faced. Labor union is boxing 
while dancing with its counterpart: On the one hand, HMC workers take an 
adversarial stance toward their employer and have no hesitation in using 
their militancy to defend their own interests. In this sense, they are still 
“boxing” with their enemy called management, but on the other hand, they 
seek to maximize their interests by excluding potential competitors from 
rewards and colluding with their employer in distributing prosperity. In this 
sense, they are “dancing” with their partner called management. Such a 
contradicting aspect is the true characteristic of HMC workers’ recent labor 
unionism and industrial relations.
More generally, Korean labor unions, notable for their militancy, have 
come face to face with the crisis of labor solidarity in the era of neoliberal 
globalization and labor polarization. The privileged group of workers at 
chaebŏls in the export sector seeks to defend their vested interests via the 
strategy of social closure to underprivileged groups such as irregular workers 
or those at SMEs. Such a strategy is likely to lead to working-class 
fragmentation as well as cross-class coalition in prosperous chaebŏl firms 
over distributional issues. 
Appendix: Coding of Labor Protest Events 
Definition of labor protest event: 
Labor protest event is defined as “any kind of group activity carried out by 
workers (more than five persons), labor unions, or informal workers’ 
organizations on behalf of their collective interests, in which claims were 
made against some other group, employers, elites, or authorities.”
Coding of a series of actions: 
If a newspaper article reports a series of actions that are separated in time 
196 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, Vol. 41 No. 2, December 2012
(different days or clearly separated periods in one day) and/or space (clearly 
separated parts of a city), I coded each of them as a separate event. If articles 
describe one group’s different actions that are not clearly separated in time 
and/or space (namely a chain of events), I coded the most radical action 
form. 
Categorization of labor protests: 
Categorization of the action forms of labor protest is based on that of Kriesi 
et al. (1995) and Rucht (1998) as follows; 
  -  Conventional protests: signature, petition or procedural complaint, 
leaflet, lawsuit, public hearing, advertisement, press conference, and 
public letter. 
  -  Demonstrative protests: if legal, public assembly, rally, demonstration, 
protest march, strike, and sabotage. 
  -  Confrontational protests: occupation, blockade, sit-in, disturbance, 
hindrance, unlawful strike or work-stoppage, and all other illegal 
demonstrative activities. 
  -  Violent protests: property damage, aggressive bodily contact, personal 
injury, violent demonstration, fire attack, and physical violence against 
others. 
Coding of strikes: 
Strike is defined as “all forms of work-stoppage by group of workers or labor 
union.” It includes all sort of strikes (legal or illegal), collective absenteeism, 
and collective early-leave. The duration day of a “partial” strike is measured 
according to the criteria of eight working hours as one day: For example, a 
partial strike of four hours is measured as 0.5 duration day). In addition, if 
the time intervals between strike actions of the same actor are more than one 
day (24 hours), it is considered as separate.  
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